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## Introduction

The reader of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* today is likely to find little in the way of subject matter or form that is startling or revolutionary. Such was not the case in 1916. When the novel was first published, many were taken aback by its frank treatment of an adolescent's world of fantasy and the intense concentration on the experiences of a single character consisting of a series of portraitlike scenes often separated in time by months and even years but presented, seemingly, without transitions. Also unusual in a work of prose was the poetic use of imagery to provide structural and thematic continuity. But with time and developments in literary awareness, the reader of today may find Joyce's last two works difficult but approachable and *Portrait*, on first reading, fairly conventional.

Part of the reason for this change in the reader's understanding of literature lies with the large number of critical essays that have sought to interpret such works. Since *Portrait* is concerned with the developing personality of "the artist," Stephen Dedalus, it is not surprising that many of these early critical studies of Joyce's novel concentrated on

Stephen's sensual awareness. By their number as well as their arguments they have shown the importance of imagery for an understanding of the novel. However, most of these early studies deal with general characteristics of particular thematic groups of images.<sup>1</sup> Since the entire novel is developed from the point of view of Stephen's experiences, images are highly interrelated and often change in their connotations as Stephen grows older. Studies of isolated clusters of images usually do not consider this interaction or take into account changes in implication as the novel progresses. Indeed, to do so would mean that a scholar would need access to each occurrence of every image and, second, be able to "visualize" how this mass of data is structured. Just the clerical work of such a venture has made it impractical; however, with the availability of the modern, high-speed computer to the literary critic, at least the clerical stumbling block has been removed. By using the computer I have tried to study the imagery of *Portrait* in a comprehensive manner that has been impractical before now. Since this approach to literary analysis is relatively new and perhaps alien to the discipline, I have stated as thoroughly as I can my literary assumptions at each step of the analysis. The remainder of this introductory chapter attempts to locate the context of this study within traditional literary criticism and to develop the thesis and point of view to be used.

The process of images changing in their associative links has been discussed briefly by William York Tindall in his *Reader's Guide to James Joyce*, under the term *recurrent image*:

Unobtrusive, escaping notice at first appearance and even at second or third, it gains power through reappearance. Bringing meaning from one place to another, it deposits some there and,

acquiring more, brings it along. . . . Rarely essential, this carrier of meaning helps other agents out, adding richness, depth, and immediacy to what we get from character and plot. The structural value of recurrent images is clear; for, in winding in and out, they knit the whole together. Escaping the notice of a casual reader, they affect him beneath the level of notice. The alert reader, preferring to know what affects him, finds pleasure in its discovery.<sup>2</sup>

Tindall illustrates his thesis of dynamic associative development by discussing several important image groups. *Water*, he notes, which is fundamentally repulsive in the early pages of *Portrait*, begins to expand and change in its implications with the image of water dripping into the "brimming bowl" at the end of Chapter I.

Although Tindall states that "these images are not signs with one fixed meaning," he sometimes emphasizes a single association to the extent that the assignment seems fixed or static. For example, all other implications of the *rose* image are inundated by the association he sees between it and Dante's rose symbol:

Dante's rose, multifloriate but not overblown, unites rose and woman. Incapable as yet of apprehending this union, Stephen approaches it in *A Portrait* on hearing the servant singing "Rosie O'Grady" in her kitchen:

For I love sweet Rosie O'Grady  
And Rosie O'Grady loves me.

"There's real love," says Cranly. "Do you know what the words mean?" "I want to see Rosie first," says Stephen; but, escaping him, she remains to be seen until the end of *Ulysses*. There Stephen approximates Dante's vision, but here, however roseate, Stephen's vision is pathetic from one point of view, comic from another. Overblown prose is his nearest equivalent for the green rose of his child's garden. (Connolly, pp. 91-92)

Similarly, images of females are generalized to the extent that they, too, seem static and restricted :

Since most of the girls in *A Portrait* approximate or suggest the Virgin in one way or another, she seems as central in the book as in the mind of Stephen, prefect of her sodality and private adorer. Mary is woman to him and woman is Mary, ideal, unattainable. Eileen of the cool, white hands, his first best girl . . . is unattainable because Protestant; but even she is the "Tower of Ivory" from the Virgin's litany. (Connolly, p. 92)

The concept of images as dynamic, accumulating connotations and complexities of meaning, suggests that they must be embedded in some mind, presumably that of the protagonist. Tindall does not develop this implied relation between patterns of images and the structure of mind; however, Hugh Kenner does in his discussion of Joyce's use of language in *Portrait*:

Joyce as an artist is working in language, but his material is psychology. His linguistic symbols represent psychological experiences detached from their context and put in motion in the new context of the printed page.<sup>3</sup>

The context of words on the page is similar to the mental context of the protagonist, but the links among words or images that Kenner sees are static as indicated by the word *crystallize* in the following passage :

These verbal leitmotifs are a technique for indicating simultaneously the alignment of ideas in the protagonist's mind and the motivation of such alignment; the emotions which Joyce's dramatic context attaches to the key-words combine, interact, and crystallize as the language indicates. (Connolly, p. 38)

This attitude results in comprehensive statements which,

while helpful and true in general, sometimes miss subtle changes in associations. For example, he associates *fire* simply with *sin*.<sup>4</sup> This is true in Chapter III of *Portrait*, but *fire* has a radically different set of associations in the first chapter.

I wish to develop a thesis, combining aspects of both Tindall's and Kenner's viewpoints, arguing that the dynamic patterns of associations among images on the page reflect the developing structure of Stephen's mind. Support for this position can be found in Stephen's aesthetic theory developed in Chapter V of the novel. His ideas are based on a sentence from Aquinas which he translates as follows: "Three things are needed for beauty, wholeness, harmony, and radiance."<sup>5</sup> Wholeness he identifies with *integritas*:

An esthetic image is presented to us either in space or in time. What is audible is presented in time, what is visible is presented in space. But, temporal or spatial, the esthetic image is first luminously apprehended as self-bounded and self-contained upon the immeasurable background of space or time which is not it. You apprehend it as *one* thing. You see is as one whole. You apprehend its wholeness. That is *integritas*. (p. 212)

Several points may be noted concerning this passage. First, Stephen's "aesthetic image" is closely related to the act of apprehension itself. Second, there is a finely drawn distinction between the active and passive participation of the mind in the perceptual act. Stephen states that the image "is presented"; thus the mind receives the initial form of the image. However, the mind's active participation is indicated in the process of "bounding" or "distinguishing" the individual sense impression. That is, the aesthetic image can be distinguished from the sensory data that flood the mind only by paring away all that is not the image. By focusing itself

upon the one particular cluster of sensory impressions that constitute the aesthetic image, the mind is both receptive to and dependent upon a reality external to itself, but it can know and comprehend that reality only through selectivity and delineation.

The second phase of Stephen's discussion of the aesthetic image concerns harmony or *consonantia*:

—Then said Stephen, you pass from point to point, led by its formal lines; you apprehend it as balanced part against part within its limits; you feel the rhythm of its structure. In other words the synthesis of immediate perception is followed by the analysis of apprehension. Having first felt that it is *one* thing you feel now that it is a thing. You apprehend it as complex, multiple, divisible, separable, made up of its parts, the result of its parts and their sum, harmonious. That is *consonantia*. (p. 212)

As Stephen points out, this is the analytic stage of apprehension. The impression is divided into its parts, and the perceiver sets about discovering relationships: part to part, part to aggregate of parts, and part to the whole. The question arises, does this harmony exist in the physical world or does it exist only in the mind of the perceiver? If the latter is true, there is the further problem of discovering the relation between the "harmony" within subjective apprehension and that within the phenomenal world. If we argue that the harmony exists solely within the mind, solipsism raises its ugly head; if we assume that harmony exists in the physical world, we are led to the conclusion that we can have absolute knowledge of the physical object. Stephen does not solve the problem in this statement, but he hints at the solution by emphasizing the affective dimension of the experience with the verb *feel*: "Having first felt that it is one thing you now feel that it is a thing." That "thing" that is

being analyzed is, of course, the datum of apprehension that has already become part of the subjective state through sensory experience. Thus analysis is a part of the internal, subjective world of experience. The relation between this experience and the physical world that saves the theory from solipsism is developed in the third discussion, concerning *claritas*.

The discussion of *claritas* contains two major parts. First, Stephen states what he does not mean by the term; then he gives a precise statement of what he does mean. The first half of this statement has been largely ignored, often with unfortunate results. For example, Frank Kermode extracts from Stephen's theory his own working definition of the romantic image; in discussing Stephen's conversation with Lynch, Kermode notes:

The main topic is, in fact, that "esthetic image" explained in Thomist language by Stephen Dedalus in the *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: it is for him that beauty which has the three attributes of integrity, consonance and clarity; which is "apprehended as one thing . . . self-abounded and self-contained upon the immeasurable background of space or time which is not it"; apprehended in its *quidditas* by the artist whose mind is arrested in "a luminous stasis of esthetic pleasure."<sup>6</sup>

Kermode rightly sees Joyce's *image* as growing out of the romantic tradition, but he goes too far when he states that Joyce's image is the equivalent of Pater's vision<sup>7</sup> and that the "symbol of the French is . . . the Romantic Image writ large and given more elaborate metaphysical and magical support."<sup>8</sup> This interpretation contradicts what Stephen says. If we take Arthur Symons's definitions of symbol and symbolism, as Joyce probably did and Kermode explicitly

does, we see a clearly idealistic emphasis. Symons borrows Carlyle's definition of symbol:

In the Symbol proper, what we can call a Symbol, there is ever more or less distinctly and directly, some embodiment and revelation of the Infinite; the Infinite is made to blend itself with the Finite, to stand visible, and as it were, attainable there.<sup>9</sup>

By symbolism Symons means "a literature in which the visible world is no longer a reality, and the unseen world no longer a dream."<sup>10</sup> Pater in similar fashion denies the "fruits of experience" in favor of an exaltation of experience itself: "To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life."<sup>11</sup> The result is a world view in which literature becomes a universal, replacing religion:

Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least among "the children of this world," in art and song. For our one chance lies in expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time. Great passions may give us this quickened sense of life, ecstasy and sorrow of love, the various forms of enthusiastic activity, disinterested or otherwise, which comes naturally to many of us. Only be sure it is passion—that it does yield you this fruit of a quickened, multiplied consciousness. Of such wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake, has most. The art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments' sake.<sup>12</sup>

Stephen rejects both of these views:

It [Thomas's phrase] would lead you to believe that he had in mind symbolism or idealism, the supreme quality of beauty being a light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but the shadow, the reality of which it is but the



symbol. I thought he might mean that *claritas* is the artistic discovery and representation of the divine purpose in anything or a force of generalization which would make the esthetic image a universal one, make it outshine its proper conditions. But that is literary talk. I understand it so. (p. 213)

The term *literary talk* in this context indicates that Stephen considers both of these interpretations of *claritas* insubstantial and invalid.

Having denied the restrictiveness of transcendental idealism on the one hand and the diffusiveness of a completely autonomous art on the other, Stephen defines what he does mean by the term:<sup>13</sup>

When you have apprehended that basket as one thing and have then analysed it according to its form and apprehended it as a thing you make the only synthesis which is logically and esthetically permissible. You see that it is that thing which it is and no other thing. The radiance of which he speaks is the scholastic *quidditas*, the *whatness* of a thing. This supreme quality is felt by the artist when the esthetic image is first conceived in his imagination. The mind in that mysterious instant Shelley likened beautifully to a fading coal. The instant wherein that supreme quality of beauty, the clear radiance of the esthetic image, is apprehended luminously by the mind which has been arrested by its wholeness and fascinated by its harmony is the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure, a spiritual state very like Galvani, using a phrase almost as beautiful as Shelley's, called the enchantment of the heart. (p. 213)

Before considering the meaning of the statement, I wish to look at several of the images present. *Radiance*, the *glow of the fading coal*, the *enchantment of heart* produced in the frog's heart by Galvani's electrical stimulus all imply transfer—transfer of light or energy—resulting in some emotional or physical stimulation in the receiver. Thus the terms of the

statement emphasize that the image originates in the physical world and is transmitted to the individual perceiver. This point, implied in *Portrait*, is part of the actual definition of *claritas* found in *Stephen Hero*:

When the relation of the parts is exquisite, when the parts are adjusted to the special point, we recognize that it is *that* thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany.<sup>14</sup>

There, Stephen indicates that the thing itself achieves epiphany; in *Portrait*, the empathic projection of feeling or sensation is recognized as an aspect of the perceiver and the emotion involved in the experience is seen to be his: "This supreme quality is felt by the artist." Thus, a great part of the emotion present involves the affective union of perceiver and that which is perceived. As we would expect, this union is not physical, but psychological.

The key term in the passage from *Stephen Hero* is *synthesis*. Once the aesthetic image has been isolated from all that is not it—just as Stephen's definition of image is distinguished first from what it is not—and analyzed into components, it must be synthesized into some larger whole. The nature of that whole can be inferred from Stephen's qualified description of the process of synthesis: "the only synthesis which is logically and esthetically permissible." The context of the logical and aesthetic faculties is, of course, the mind of the perceiver. Thus, the parts of the experience must "fit" into a pattern or structure that exists within the mind and that is "natural" or pleasing to that mind—that is, the associative links among the components of the image are merged with the vastly broader and more complex associative structure of the mind. It is not necessary that this

contextual structure of the mind already embody the links inherent within the image; in fact, those links may be formed in the epiphanic experience itself. What is important is the realization of the validity of the structure both internally (in the subjective context) and externally (in the object perceived). A. D. Hope uses an analogy for this experience that is most helpful:

If we take the metaphor of the traveller pausing on the hill top and surveying the landscape before him with the help of a map it may be possible to give some idea of the nature of the conception that underlies Joyce's description of *claritas*. If we imagine the map as in the traveller's mind and as the work of his mind, such that instead of the formal signs of roads, houses, fields and hills the mind has constructed a map-picture, we shall have something like the phantasma, or in the case under discussion, the esthetic image. We can further imagine the map-picture to be a transparent one such that when it is held between the intellectual eye and the landscape the traveller not only perceives the landscape endowed with its formal meaning, he is also able to observe the exact correspondence of the details of the map with the details of the landscape before him. He becomes aware of the truth of his mental work.<sup>15</sup>

Although the map or model is within the mind of the perceiver, it is subject to confirmation. When it is seen to fit, there follows a sense that there exists in the physical world some embodiment of the perceiver's mental structure. In *Stephen Hero*, Stephen indicated that this breaking down of the barrier is actual—that the image itself has the epiphany—and the viewer somehow participates in the experience; in *Portrait*, such actual union is denied and the whole theory is stated in terms of the perceiver's psychology.

Stephen does not approach directly the problem of the relation between inner and outer, perceiver and perceived;

however, his statements strongly suggest the distinction that Whitehead makes between the subjective and objective modes of experience. Subject and object, Whitehead states, are relative terms :

An occasion is a subject in respect to its special activity concerning an object; and anything is an object in respect to its provocation of some special activity within a subject.<sup>16</sup>

He continues :

The process of experiencing is constituted by the reception of entities, whose being is antecedent to that process, into the complex fact which is that process itself. These antecedent entities, thus received as factors into the process of experiencing, are termed "objects" for that experiential occasion. Thus primarily the term "object" expresses the relation of the entity, thus denoted, to one or more occasions of experiencing.<sup>17</sup>

The object, then, is an object only by virtue of the fact that it is a datum apprehended by a subject. Knowledge is defined across an interface, but it is the phenomenal interface between "subjective experience" and "objective experience"—not the literal, physical interface between physical world and epidermis. Whitehead summarizes :

All knowledge is conscious discrimination of objects experienced. But this conscious discrimination, which is knowledge, is nothing more than an additional factor in the subjective form of the interplay of subject and object.<sup>18</sup>

He goes on to discuss the term *experience*:

The process of experiencing is constituted by the reception of objects into the unity of the complex occasion which is the process itself. The process creates itself, but it does not

create the objects which it receives as factors in its own nature.<sup>19</sup>

Thus, the subjective state is active relative to the objective datum, but the entire complex is dependent upon some ultimate external reference. Knowledge, which develops from the organic interplay of these two modes, is subject to development, augmentation, and correction within the flux of the individual's experience.

Whitehead's object corresponds to Stephen's image of sensory data. It is experienced by the perceiver (objective experience) and becomes part of the subjective context (subjective experience). When the image is complex and when the mind's associative patterns have many ramifications, Stephen suggests that there will be an apparent dissolution of the barrier between inner and outer. While not possible physically, dissolution is possible psychologically. In cases of extreme emotional arousal, the individual may *experience* a fusion of the objective and subjective components such that the interface disappears in the process. He *senses* a continuity between his experience of self and his experience of his environment. He seeks and finds an embodiment of himself in his experience of physical reality. But such union occurs between internal modes of perception, not across actual, physical distances. This interpretation, while not stated by Stephen, is consistent with both the general formulation of his aesthetic within terms of his model of perception and his denial of mystical union with physical reality.

Neither Stephen's discussion of *claritas* nor Hope's analogy includes the affective dimension of the experience. In the moment of affirmation, the individual senses or experiences a continuum between the thing perceived and himself. This continuum, as we have seen, exists across the interface between the subjective and objective levels of exper-

ience, but the experience carries with it the illusion of actual union. Clearly the emotional level will not be the same for all moments of apprehension. While all human perception necessarily involves an affective dimension, in many of our experiences this dimension goes almost unnoticed. However, when the "harmony" or structure of components is defined in a way that is radically different from previous patterns in the mind, the individual experiences what Joyce in *Stephen Hero* calls "epiphanal joy" distinguishing the aesthetic image at epiphanic moments from the image involved in all acts of apprehension. Seen in this way, the epiphany is not a revelation of truth from some external or ideal realm, nor is it simply the individual's impassioned projection of his hopes upon the external; it is a fusion of objective experience and subjective experience, generating a substantial realignment of the relations among the images within the perceiver's mind.<sup>20</sup> The latter are moments that Stephen called moments of "luminous, silent stasis," which are infused with "epiphanal joy." The former constitutes the absorption of sensory data at a level such that the individual may be hardly aware of the process. These two levels of experience, however, are not completely independent. The epiphanic image is merely more complex in its structure of associations: more diverse—perhaps opposite—strains are brought into a harmonious relationship. The epiphanic perceptual experience is different from everyday perception in degree, not kind. It contains a wider range of components held by the mind in a particular moment. Thus, there is a quantitative relation between aesthetic images of epiphanic intensity and the images of ordinary experience that flood the mind at all times. As the individual becomes more and more aware of objective experience, he becomes emotionally stimulated and hence more receptive; the process builds until the ex-

perience either subsides or culminates in epiphany. We would suspect that not all epiphanies carry the same intensity: some embody more facets of experience than others. But the most important implication is that there is a direct, quantitative relation between epiphanic image and the image of ordinary perception.

This last point has interesting implications for literary analysis as well as for aesthetic or psychological theory. There has long been disagreement among critics as to what constitutes an image within a work of literature. At one extreme, Frank Kermode takes as his definition of image Stephen's definition of aesthetic image of epiphanic intensity such that a novel like *Portrait* may contain only a few dozen "images" of this kind. At the other extreme, Caroline Spurgeon uses the term to refer to

[a] kind of simile, as well as every kind of what is really every compressed metaphor . . . connoting any and every imaginative picture or other experience, drawn in every kind of way, which may have come to the poet, not only through any of his senses, but through his mind and emotions as well, and which he uses, in the forms of simile and metaphor in their widest sense, for analogy.<sup>21</sup>

This use of the term, denoting all sensory experiences, corresponds to the image of immediate, everyday perception discussed above. Just as differences between levels of psychological experiences were resolved quantitatively, so the differences between these two literary terms can be resolved quantitatively within the text. Before doing this and stating the major thesis, however, I wish to summarize the implications of the psychological theory developed so far stated as a model of mind and then show how this model relates to the text of the novel.

A clear distinction between objective and subjective modes of experience has been seen above. The idea of objective experience assumes an ultimate physical reality, but this reality cannot be approached directly: all knowledge of it must come through the sensory mechanisms. The stimuli from these mechanisms when they enter the mind constitute the objective experience. On the "other side" lies the subjective experience. It is composed of several different facets. There is a clearly conscious level of awareness that contains consciously known associations among experiences, the logical faculty, and certain language components. Below this lies the subconscious, which contains much more complex associative links between past experiences and current image. The border between these two subjective levels, however, is not distinct. For example, in the last two chapters of *Portrait* the image of sea, with strands of seaweed coming up from unseen depths into ever lighter levels of water, becomes a major image of mind with the strands of seaweed connoting associative patterns among images. Permeating all levels of the subjective, then, are strands of associations that exist *de facto* or from experience. The most closely analogous relation is that of the arbitrary cultural association between word and meaning. Thus, it is "language" that permeates this entire complex and that most vividly embodies and reveals its organization and structure.

The interface between objective experience and the subjective continuum is the phenomenal level of experience, and it is in this domain that the image exists. As the person becomes more and more aware of the image components existing at this interface, he directs more and more attention to the examination or analysis of the components of objective experience. The more this is done, the more aware he becomes. The process is helical: as more and more images—



facets of experience—are brought together into a single experience, they are seen to conform to a larger, more complex pattern. When the ultimate fusion takes place, there is a great emotional response—epiphanic joy—such that the individual senses a realization or embodiment of himself within his experience of the physical world. This produces a sense of continuity between himself and the physical universe. What is actually happening, we have seen, is that the objective and subjective modes of experience momentarily fuse. It is this important point that keeps Stephen's aesthetics from collapsing into suggesting mystical union with physical reality. In this moment the complex of associations existing within the phenomenal dimension of experience is seen to conform with the more comprehensive pattern of the subjective state. This fusion is often marked by stronger reinforcement of relations among images previously linked as "opposites" or by totally "new" linkings. The result is a marked change in the composition of the personality or mind. The personality is in a sense a "different," more aware, more comprehensive structure than before. Apparently qualitative changes in personality are produced by experiences that are actually quantitatively different from "ordinary" experiences.

So far, this discussion has concentrated on the psychological aspects of Stephen's definition of image. While Stephen emphasizes this dimension, he indicates that it is the image that links the artist with his audience: "The image, it is clear, must be set between the mind or senses of the artist himself and the mind or senses of others" (p. 213). In the case of an autobiographical novel such as *Portrait*, we can interject in front of the artist's mind the fictive mind of Stephen and thus expect the image to link Stephen's mind with that of the reader. Consequently, we would ex-

pect concentrations in the text of images of varying connotations to be strongly affective in two directions—that is, these passages should correspond to the moments of major development in Stephen's personality (as suggested by the psychological aspects of his theory) but these passages should also be important in the reader's response to the novel as a work of art. The latter effect may be termed the aesthetic use of imagery. Although to prove or argue the affective quality of a work is impossible, I shall point out passages that seem to display imagery used in this way. The other side of the proposition can be handled more formally. That is, there should be a clear relation between Stephen's epiphanies, those climactic moments of experience which mark a fundamental change in personality, and the concentrations in the text of images of sensory impression as defined by Caroline Spurgeon.

These propositions may be summarized in the following hypothesis. There is a quantitative relation between the number of sensory images present in a section of text and the epiphanic moments. Those moments of realignment of associations of experience will be accompanied by a build-up in the density of important images. Second, since the personality of Stephen is in a sense reshaped at those moments, we can trace the development of his mind by first establishing the patterns of associations among images and then noting how these alignments are altered at epiphanic moments. Since the entire narrative concerns either Stephen's thoughts or the action, events, or physical objects around him, we may infer that images presented close to one another in the narrative line are near one another in Stephen's experience. Thus, images that occur close together in a section of text are very likely associated in Stephen's mind.

In discussing Joyce's aesthetic use of imagery, I shall concentrate on its structural role in the novel. Often entire scenes are organized or held together by repetition of image groups. In other instances, continuity is provided between scenes by the imagery, while on a larger scale, Joyce modulates the entire density of imagery rhythmically in chapter-long sections of text.

Formally, I shall consider an image any word or phrase with a sensuous or thematic aspect.<sup>22</sup> Included are all references to colors, odors, tastes, etcetera. A statement given a distinctly auditory quality—by a descriptive verb such as *shouted*—would be considered an image. I regard the motif “soft, grey air” as being composed of three distinct images—*soft*, *grey*, and *air*—that happen to be combined in some instances for thematic purposes. Words such as *God*, *sacrament*, and *pure*, which have limited sensory value but are known to function thematically, will also be included in the list of images; however, most themes will be demonstrated, not assumed.

To make this analysis as comprehensive as possible I shall use a large high-speed computer. Major attention will be given to those images which cluster around the larger images or epiphanic moments. To determine the evolution of associations among these images, we must note the environments of large numbers of images in the novel. This the computer can facilitate. It is not to be assumed that the computer has just “spilled out” the results. The computer does “look-up” tasks, produces graphs and tables for reference and demonstration, and in general carries out exhaustively the instructions and procedures provided. Responsibility for the interpretation of this material must lie with the author.

Because of the inherent linearity of the approach, the

major portion of this discussion will consist of five chapters, one devoted to the development of imagery patterns for each chapter of *Portrait*. A final summary of the major findings of this study will be made in the conclusion. Following this are a series of appendixes. The first describes computer techniques and defines terms such as *richness of imagery*, *statistical importance of an image*, and *weighed volume of imagery* for a section of text. A number of lists, charts, and graphs referenced in the discussion follow Appendix A.