

# Mining System Audit Data: Opportunities and Challenges

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## Abstract

Intrusion detection is an essential component of computer security mechanisms. It requires accurate and efficient analysis of a large amount of system and network audit data. It can thus be an application area of data mining. There are several characteristics of audit data: abundant raw data, rich system and network semantics, and ever “streaming”. Accordingly, when developing data mining approaches, we need to focus on: feature extraction and construction, customization of (general) algorithms according to semantic information, and optimization of execution efficiency of the output models. In this paper, we describe a data mining framework for mining audit data for intrusion detection models. We discuss its advantages and limitations, and outline the open research problems.

## 1 Introduction

As the Internet plays an increasingly important role in our society, e.g., the infrastructure for E-Commerce and Digital Government, criminals and enemies have begun devising and launching sophisticated attacks motivated by financial, political, and even military objectives. We must ensure the security, i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability, of our network infrastructures. *Intrusion detection* is the process of identifying and responding to malicious activity aimed at compromising computer and network security [2]. It is a critical component of the defense-in-depth security mechanisms, which also include: security policy, vulnerability scanning and patching, authentication and access control, encryption, program wrappers, firewalls, and intrusion tolerance.

Intrusion detection is a very hard problem. There are always “security holes” due to design flaws, implementation errors, and operation oversights in today’s complex network systems. Research in software engineering has shown that it is hard to pre-

vent, discover, and remove all software “bugs”. It is even harder to prevent and detect intrusions because *intelligent* adversaries, with *malicious* intents, can exploit the security holes (and their combinations) to devise potentially a very large number of intrusion methods.

Most intrusion detection approaches rely on analysis of system and network *audit data*. Network traffic can be recorded using “packet capturing” utilities (e.g., libpcap [16]), and operating system activities can be recorded at the system call level (e.g., BSM [19]). A basic premise here is that when audit mechanisms are enabled, distinct evidence of legitimate activities and intrusions will be manifested in the audit data. Thus, instead of (statically) analyzing (all source codes of) complex software, intrusion detection uses a more practical approach of analyzing the audit records of run-time activities of networks and systems (and users).

At an abstract level, an intrusion detection system (IDS) extracts *features*, i.e., the individual pieces of evidence, from the system event-level or network packet-level audit data, and uses some modeling and analysis algorithms to reason about the available evidence. Traditionally, IDSs are developed by knowledge-engineering. Expert knowledge or intuition of networks, operating systems, and attack methods are used to select the features, and handcraft the detection rules. Given the complexities of today’s network environments and the sophistication of the increasingly hostile attackers, the so-called expert knowledge is often very limited and unreliable.

On the other hand, data mining approaches can be used to extract features and compute detection models from the vast amount of audit data. The features computed from data can be more “objective” than the ones hand-picked by experts. The inductively learned detection models can be more “generalizable” than hand-coded rules (that is, they can have better performance against new variants of known normal behavior or intrusions). There-

fore, data mining approaches can play an important role in the process of developing an IDS. We need to point out that data mining should *complement* rather than exclude the use of expert knowledge. Our objective should be to provide the tools, grounded on sound statistics and machine learning principles, for IDS developers to construct better ID models quickly and easily. For example, experts can view and edit the patterns and rules produced by data mining approaches, and translate them into efficient detection modules.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first give a brief overview of research in intrusion detection, particularly data mining-based approaches. We then describe the characteristics of audit data. We next present a data mining framework for extracting features and computing detection models, and describe our experiments and results. We then discuss the benefits of as well as research challenges in applying data mining approaches to intrusion detection.

## 1.1 Related Work

Several influential research IDSs were developed from mid-80's to mid-90's. STAT [6] and IDIOT [8] are *misuse detection* systems that use the "signatures" of known attacks, i.e., the patterns of attack behavior or effects, to identify a matched activity as an attack instance. By definition, misuse detection is not effective against *new* attacks, i.e., those that do not have known signatures. NIDES [3] has an *anomaly detection* subsystem that uses established normal profiles, i.e., the expected behavior, to identify any unacceptable deviation as the result of an attack. Anomaly detection is capable of catching new attacks. However, new legitimate behavior can also be falsely identified as an attack, resulting in a false alarm. These systems and most of the later research and commercial systems are developed using a pure knowledge-engineering process.

In recent years, there have been several learning-based or data mining-based research efforts in intrusion detection. Warrender et al. [20] showed that a number of machine-learning approaches, e.g., rule induction, can be used to learn the normal execution profile of a program, which is the short sequences of its run-time system calls made. These learned models were shown to be able to accurately detect anomalies caused by exploits on the programs. Lane and Brodley developed machine learning algorithms for analyzing user shell commands and detecting anomalies of user activities [9]. A team of researchers at Columbia University have

been working on data mining-based intrusion detection since 1996 (see Stolfo et al. [18] for an overview). The main capabilities developed in this research include: pattern mining and feature construction, cost-sensitive modeling for efficient run-time model execution, anomaly detection, learning over noisy data, and correlation analysis over multiple of data streams. The ADAM project at George Mason University is developing anomaly detection algorithms based on automated audit data analysis. (see <http://ise.gmu.edu/~dbarbara/adam.html>)

## 2 Audit Data

The first step in applying or developing data mining approaches for an application is to have a basic understanding of the problem domain. We briefly discuss the main characteristics of audit data.

First, system audit data is "raw", i.e., in binary format, unstructured, and time dependent. For data mining, we need to first preprocess audit data to a suitable form, i.e., ASCII tabular data with attributes (or features). For example, data output by libpcap contains binary records describing network packets. The records are ordered by the timestamps (i.e., packet arrival time). In order to analyze a network connection, we need to first "summarize" all packet data that belong to the same connection. The connection data, in ASCII format, can contain for each connection its source and destination hosts, service (e.g., telnet, ftp, etc.), and the number of bytes transferred, etc., that describe the connection activities. The key objective of audit data preprocessing is to *extract and construct appropriate features* so that effective detection models can be constructed. The challenge for data mining is to develop techniques to automate some of the knowledge-intensive data preprocessing and feature extraction tasks.

Second, audit data contains rich network and system semantics. For example, network connections that originate from the same host, destined for the same host, or request the same service may be "related" to a specific user or program activity. Such semantics or context information is very useful in intrusion detection. The challenge for data mining is to *customize* the general algorithms to incorporate domain knowledge so that only the *relevant* patterns are computed from audit data.

Third, audit data is high-speed and high-volume streaming data. Auditing mechanisms are designed to record *all* network and system activities in great details. While this can ensure that no intrusion

evidence will be missed, the high-speed and high-volume data stream requires the run-time execution of detection models be very efficient. Otherwise, the long delay in data analysis simply presents a time window for attacks to succeed. The challenge for data mining is to develop techniques to compute detection models that are not only accurate but also *efficient in run-time execution*.

## 2.1 Data Mining Algorithms

Several types of algorithms are particularly useful for mining audit data.

**Classification** An ideal application in intrusion detection will be to gather sufficient “normal” and “abnormal” audit data for a user or a program, then apply a classification algorithm to learn a classifier that can label or predict new unseen audit data as belonging to the normal class or the abnormal class.

**Association analysis** Associations of system features in audit data, for example, the correlation between *command* and *argument* in the shell command history data of a user, can serve as the basis for constructing normal usage profiles.

**Sequence analysis** Frequent patterns of time-based network and system activities provide guidelines for incorporating temporal statistical measures into intrusion detection models. For example, frequent patterns of network-based denial-of-service (DoS) attacks suggest that several per-host and per-service measures should be included.

## 3 A Framework

We have developed a data mining framework for constructing features and intrusion detection models from audit data [10]. Using this framework, raw (binary) audit data is first processed and summarized into network connection records (or host session records) containing a number of basic features: timestamp, duration, source and destination IP addresses and port numbers, protocol type, and an error condition flag. Specialized data mining programs [12, 10] are applied to compute frequent patterns, i.e., the association rules [1] describing the correlations among the features, and the frequent episodes [15] describing the frequently co-occurring events across the records. The consistent patterns of normal activities and the “unique” patterns associated with intrusions are then identified and analyzed to construct additional features for the records [13]. Machine learning algorithms (e.g., the RIPPER [4] classification rule learner) are then used to learn

the detection models. For (run-time) execution efficiency, multiple models each with different computation cost and detection accuracy are produced. The idea is to execute the lighter weight detection model(s) first; and if the desired prediction accuracy is not attained, the more time-consuming models will then be activated [5].

We next describe the key components of this framework in more details.

## 3.1 Pattern Mining and Comparison

We compute the association rules and frequent episodes from audit data, which capture the intra- and inter-audit record patterns. These frequent patterns can be regarded as the statistical summaries of network and system activities captured in the audit data, because they measure the correlations among system features and the sequential (i.e., temporal) co-occurrences of events.

The basic association rules and frequent episodes algorithms do not consider any domain knowledge. That is, assume  $I$  is the interestingness measure of a pattern  $p$ , then  $I(p) = f(\text{support}(p), \text{confidence}(p))$ , where  $f$  is some ranking function. As a result, the basic algorithms can generate many rules that are “irrelevant” (i.e., uninteresting) to the application. When customizing these algorithms for audit data, we incorporate *schema-level* knowledge into the interestingness measures. Assume  $I_A$  is a measure of whether a pattern  $p$  contains the specified important (i.e. “interesting”) attributes, our extended interestingness measure is  $I_e(p) = f_e(I_A(p), f(\text{support}(p), \text{confidence}(p))) = f_e(I_A(p), I(p))$ , where  $f_e$  is a ranking function that first considers the attributes in the pattern, then the support and confidence values.

We discuss two kinds of important schema-level knowledge about audit data here. First, there is a partial “order of importance” among the attributes of an audit record. Some attributes are *essential* in describing the data, while others only provide auxiliary information. For example, a network connection can be uniquely identified by the combination of its start time, source host, source port, destination host, and service (destination port). These are the essential attributes when describing network data. We argue that the “relevant” association rules should describe patterns related to the essential attributes. We call the essential attribute(s) *axis* attribute(s) when they are used as a form of *item constraints* in the association rules algorithm. During candidate generation, an item set must contain value(s) of the axis attribute(s). We consider the

correlations among non-axis attributes as not interesting. In other words, if  $p$  contains axis attribute(s), then  $I_A(p) = 1$ , else  $I_A(p) = 0$ . To avoid having a huge amount of “useless” episode rules, we extended the basic frequent episodes algorithm to compute frequent sequential patterns in two phases: compute the frequent associations using the axis attribute(s); then generate the frequent serial patterns from these associations.

Another interesting schema-level information is that some attributes can be the *references* of other attributes. A group of events are related if they have the same reference attribute value. For example, connections to the same destination host can be related. When mining for patterns of such related events, we need to use *reference attribute* as an item constraint. That is, when forming an episode, an additional condition is that, within its minimal occurrences, the records covered by its constituent itemsets have the same value(s) of the reference attribute(s). In other words, if the itemsets of  $p$  refer to the same reference attribute value, then  $I_A(p) = 1$ , else  $I_A(p) = 0$ .

We can compare the patterns, i.e., frequent episodes computed using our extended algorithms, from an intrusion dataset and the patterns from the normal dataset to identify those that exhibit only in the intrusion dataset. These patterns are then used for feature construction. The details of the pattern comparison algorithm is described in [13]. The idea is to first convert patterns into numbers in such a way that “similar” patterns are mapped to “closer” numbers. Then pattern comparison and intrusion pattern identification are accomplished through comparing the numbers and rank ordering the results. We devised an encoding procedure that converts each pattern into a numerical number, where the order of digit significance corresponds to the order of importance of the features. Each unique feature value is mapped to a digit value in the encoding process. The “distance” of two patterns is then simply a number where each digit value is the digit-wise absolute difference between the two encodings. A comparison procedure computes the “intrusion score” for each pattern from the intrusion dataset, which is its lowest distance score against all patterns from the normal dataset, and outputs the user-specified top percentage patterns that have the highest intrusion scores as the “intrusion only” patterns.

As an example, consider the “SYN flood” attack where the attacker uses many spoofed source addresses to send a lot of S0 connections (only the first SYN packet, the connection request, is sent) to

a port (e.g., *http*) of the victim host in a very short time span (the victim’s connection buffer is filled up, hence Denial-of-Service). Table 1 shows one of the top intrusion only patterns, produced using *service* as the axis and *dst\_host* as the feature.

### 3.2 Feature Construction

Each of the intrusion patterns is used as a guideline for adding additional features into the connection records to build better classification models. We use the following automatic procedure for parsing a frequent episode and constructing features:

- Assume  $F_0$  (e.g., *dst\_host*) is used as the reference feature, and the width of the episode is  $w$  seconds.
- Add the following features that examine only the connections in the past  $w$  seconds that share the same value in  $F_0$  as the current connection:
  - A feature that computes “the count of these connections”;
  - Let  $F_1$  be *service*, *src\_dst* or *dst\_host* other than  $F_0$  (i.e.,  $F_1$  is an essential feature). If the same  $F_1$  value (e.g., “http”) is in all the item sets of the episode, add a feature that computes “the percentage of connections that share the same  $F_1$  value as the current connection”; otherwise, add a feature that computes “the percentage of different values of  $F_1$ ”.
  - Let  $V_2$  be a value (e.g., “S0”) of a feature  $F_2$  (e.g., *flag*) other than  $F_0$  and  $F_1$  (i.e.,  $V_2$  is a value of a non-essential feature). If  $V_2$  is in all the item sets of the episode, add a feature that computes “the percentage of connections that have the same  $V_2$ ”; otherwise, if  $F_2$  is a numerical feature, add a feature that computes “the average of the  $F_2$  values”.

This procedure parses a frequent episode and uses three operators, *count*, *percent*, and *average*, to construct statistical features. These features are also temporal since they measure only the connections that are within a time window  $w$  and share the same reference feature value. The intuition behind the feature construction algorithm comes from the straightforward interpretation of a frequent episode. For example, if the same feature value appears in all the itemsets of an episode, then there is a large percentage of records that have the same value. We treat the essential and non-essential features differently. The essential features describe the *anatomy*

Table 1: Example Intrusion Pattern

Frequent Episode	Meaning
$(flag = S0, service = http, dst\_host = victim),$ $(flag = S0, service = http, dst\_host = victim)$ $\rightarrow (flag = S0, service = http, dst\_host = victim)$ $[0.93, 0.03, 2]$	93% of the time, after two <i>http</i> connections with <i>S0</i> flag are made to host <i>victim</i> , within 2 seconds from the first of these two, the third similar connection is made, and this pattern occurs in 3% of the data

of an intrusion, for example, “the same *service* (i.e., *port*) is targeted”. The actual values, e.g., “*http*”, is often not important because the same attack method can be applied to different targets, e.g., “*ftp*”. On the other hand, the actual non-essential feature values, e.g., *flag = S0*, often indicate the *invariant* of an intrusion because they summarize the connection behavior according to the network protocols. The “SYN flood” pattern shown in Table 1 results in the following additional features: a count of connections to the same *dst\_host* in the past 2 seconds, and among these connections, the percentage of those that have the same *service*, and the percentage of those that have the “*S0*” *flag*.

### 3.3 Constructing Efficient Models

A detection model is deemed efficient if its (analysis and ) detection delay, or *computational cost*, is small enough for the model to keep up with the run-time data streams (i.e., it can detect and respond to an intrusion before much damage is done). The computational cost of a model is derived mainly from the costs of computing the required features. The feature cost includes not only the time required for computing its value, but also the time delay of its readiness (i.e., when it can be computed).

We partition features into three relative cost levels. Level 1 features, e.g., *service*, are computed using at most the first three packets (or events) of a connection (or host session). They normally require only simple recording. Level 2 features are computed in the middle or near the end of a connection using information of the current connection only. They usually require just simple book keeping. Level 3 features are computed using information from all connections within a given time window of the current connection. They are often computed as some aggregates of the level 1 and 2 features. We assign *qualitative* values to these cost levels, based on our run-time measurements with a prototype system we have developed using Network Flight Recorder (NFR) [17]: level 1 cost is 1 or 5; level 2 cost is 10; and level 3 cost is 100. It is important to note that level 1 and level 2 features must be computed indi-

vidually. However, because all level 3 features require iteration through the entire set of connections in a given time window, they can all be computed at the same time, in a single iteration. This saves computational cost when multiple level 3 features are computed for analysis of a given connection.

#### 3.3.1 A Multiple Model Approach

In order to reduce the computational cost of a detection model, the low cost features should be used whenever possible while maintaining a desired accuracy level. Our approach is to build multiple models, each using features from different cost levels. Low cost models are always evaluated first by the IDS, and high cost models are used only when the low cost models can not predict with sufficient accuracy. We use a multiple ruleset approach based on RIPPER.

Before discussing the details of our approach, it is necessary to outline the advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of rulesets that RIPPER can generate: *ordered* or *un-ordered*.

**Ordered Rulesets** An ordered ruleset has the form “if  $r_1$  then  $i_1$  elseif  $r_2$  then  $i_2, \dots$ , else *default*”. Before learning rules from a dataset, RIPPER first heuristically orders the classes by one of the following methods: *+freq*, increasing frequency; *-freq*, decreasing frequency; *given*, a user-defined ordering; *mdl*, minimal description length heuristics to guess an optimal ordering. After arranging the classes, RIPPER finds rules to separate *class<sub>1</sub>* from classes *class<sub>2</sub>, ..., class<sub>n</sub>*, then rules to separate *class<sub>2</sub>* from classes *class<sub>3</sub>, ..., class<sub>n</sub>*, and so on. The final class *class<sub>n</sub>* will become the default class. The end result is that rules for a single class will always be grouped together, but rules for *class<sub>i</sub>* are possibly simplified, because they can assume that the class of the example is one of *class<sub>i</sub>, ..., class<sub>n</sub>*. If an example is covered by rules from two or more classes, this conflict is resolved in favor of the class that comes first in the ordering.

An ordered ruleset is usually succinct and efficient. Evaluation of an entire ordered ruleset does not require each rule to be tested, but proceeds from the top of the ruleset to the bottom until any rule

evaluates to *true*. The features used by each rule can be computed one by one as evaluation proceeds. The computational cost to evaluate an ordered ruleset for a given connection is the total cost of computing unique features until a prediction is made. In any reasonable network environment, most connections are *normal*. A *-freq* ruleset is most likely lowest in computational cost and accurate in identifying *normal* connections since the top of the ruleset classifies *normal*. On the contrary, a *+freq* ruleset would most likely be higher in computational cost but more accurate in classifying intrusions than *-freq* since the ruleset identifies intrusions from *normal* connections and *normal* is the bottom default rule. Depending on the class order, the performances of *given* and *mdl* will be in between those of *-freq* and *+freq*.

**Un-ordered Rulesets** An un-ordered ruleset has at least one rule for each class and there are usually many rules for frequently occurring classes. There is also a default class which is used for prediction when none of these rules are satisfied. Unlike ordered rulesets, all rules are evaluated during prediction and conflicts are broken by using the most accurate rule. Un-ordered rulesets, in general, contain more rules and are less efficient in execution than *-freq* and *+freq* ordered rulesets, but there are usually several rules of high precision for the most frequent class, *normal*.

With the advantages and disadvantages of ordered and un-ordered rulesets in mind, we propose the following multiple ruleset approach:

- We first generate multiple training sets  $T_1, \dots, T_4$  using different feature subsets.  $T_1$  uses only cost 1 features.  $T_2$  uses features of costs 1 and 5, and so forth, up to  $T_4$ , which uses all available features.
- Rulesets  $R_1, \dots, R_4$  are learned using their respective training sets.  $R_4$  is learned as either *+freq* or *-freq* ruleset for efficiency, as it may contain the most costly features.  $R_1, \dots, R_3$  are learned as either *-freq* or un-ordered rulesets, as they will contain accurate rules for classifying *normal* connections, and we filter *normal* as early as possible to reduce computational cost.
- A precision measurement  $p_r$ <sup>1</sup> is computed for every rule,  $r$ , except for the rules in  $R_4$ .
- A threshold value  $\tau_i$  is obtained for every single class. It determines the tolerable precision

<sup>1</sup>Precision describes how accurate a prediction is. If  $P$  is the set of predictions with label  $i$  and  $W$  is the set of instances with label  $i$  in the data set, by definition,  $p = \frac{|P \cap W|}{|P|}$ .

required in order for a classification to be made by any ruleset except for  $R_4$ .

In real-time execution, the feature computation and rule evaluation proceed as follows:

- $R_1$  is evaluated and a prediction  $i$  is made.
- If  $p_r \geq \tau_i$ , the prediction  $i$  will be fired. In this case, no more features will be computed and the system will examine the next connection. Otherwise, additional features required by  $R_2$  are computed and  $R_2$  will be evaluated.
- Evaluation will continue with  $R_3$ , followed by  $R_4$ , until a prediction is made. The evaluation of  $R_4$  does not require any firing condition and will always generate a prediction.

The computational cost for a single connection is the total computational cost of all unique features used before a prediction is made. If any level 3 features (of cost 100) are used at all, the cost is counted only once since all level 3 features are calculated in one function call.

The precision and threshold values can be obtained during model training from either the training set or a separate hold-out validation set. Threshold values are set to the precisions of  $R_4$  for each class on that dataset since we want to reach the same accuracy as  $R_4$ . Precision of a rule can be obtained easily from the positive,  $p$ , and negative,  $n$ , counts of a rule,  $\frac{p}{p+n}$ . The threshold value will, on average, ensure that the predictions emitted by the first three rulesets are not less accurate than using  $R_4$  alone.

## 4 Experiments and Results

In this section, we describe our experiments in building intrusion detection models on the dataset from the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program, prepared by MIT Lincoln Lab [14].

### 4.1 The DARPA Data

We were provided with about 4 gigabytes of compressed *tcpdump* [7] data of 7 weeks of network traffic. The data can be processed into about 5 million connection records of about 100 bytes each. The data contains the content (i.e., the data portion) of every packet transmitted between hosts inside and outside a simulated military base<sup>2</sup>. The data con-

<sup>2</sup>Disclaimer: We are in no position to endorse any claim that this DARPA dataset reflects a “typical” real-world environment. We used it in our study because it is the only available comprehensive dataset with various normal background traffic conditions and a large number of attacks.

tains four main categories of attacks: DoS, denial-of-service, e.g., SYN flood; R2L, unauthorized access from a remote machine, e.g., guessing password; U2R, unauthorized access to local root privileges by a local unprivileged user, e.g., buffer-overflow attacks; and PROBING, surveillance and probing, e.g., port-scan.

We preprocessed the binary *tcpdump* packet data into ASCII connection records each with a set of *intrinsic* features, i.e., duration, source and destination hosts, service, number of bytes transferred, and a flag that signifies normal or error conditions (e.g., "S0") of connection. This set of features are commonly used in many different network analysis tasks (other than intrusion detection).

## 4.2 Feature and Model Construction

We participated in the official 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation. The 7 weeks of connection data is training data, and can be labeled using the provided "truth files". Due to constraints in time and data storage space, we did not include all connection records in pattern mining and model learning. We instead extracted all the connection records that fall within a surrounding time window of plus and minus 5 minutes of the whole duration of each attack to create a dataset for each attack type, e.g., SYN flood and port-scan. We also extracted sequences of normal records to create an aggregate normal dataset that has the same distribution as the original dataset.

For each attack type, we performed pattern mining and comparison using its intrusion dataset and the normal dataset. We constructed features according to the top 20% intrusion-only patterns of each attack type. Here we summarize the automatically constructed temporal and statistical features:

- The "same host" feature that examine only the connections in the past 2 seconds that have the same destination host as the current connection: the count of such connections, the percentage of connections that have the same service as the current one, the percentage of different services, the percentage of SYN errors, and the percentage of REJ (i.e., rejected connection) errors;
- The "same service" features that examine only the connections in the past 2 seconds that have the same service as the current connection: the count of such connections, the percentage of different destination hosts, the percentage of SYN errors, and the percentage of REJ errors.




Figure 1: The Overall Detection Performance

We call these the "time-based traffic" features for connection records. In order to detect "slow" PROBING attacks, we sorted the connection records by destination hosts, then mined patterns and constructed the "host-based traffic" features that mirror the "time-based traffic" features.

We discovered that unlike most of the DoS and PROBING attacks, the R2L and U2R attacks do not have any intrusion-only frequent patterns. This is because most of the DoS and PROBING attacks involve sending a lot of connections to some host(s) in a very short period of time, and therefore can have frequent sequential patterns that are different from the normal traffic. The R2L and U2R attacks are embedded in the data portions of the packets and normally involve only a single connection. Therefore, it is unlikely that they can have any unique frequent traffic patterns. We instead used domain knowledge to construct a set of "content" features to indicate whether the connection contents suggest suspicious behavior (see [11] for details).

### 4.2.1 Results

We briefly report the performance of our detection models as evaluated by MIT Lincoln Lab [14] (see [11] for more detailed results). We trained our intrusion detection models, using the 7 weeks of labeled data, and used them to make predictions on the 2 weeks of unlabeled test data (i.e., we were not told which connection is an attack). The test data contains a total of 38 attack types, with 14 types in test data only (i.e., our models were not trained with instances of these attack types, hence these are considered as "new" attack types).

Figure 1 shows the ROC curves of the detection models on all intrusions. We compare here our models with other participants (denoted as Group 1 through 3, group 2 did not cover all intrusions) in the DARPA evaluation program<sup>3</sup>. These participating

<sup>3</sup>The tested systems produced binary output, hence, the

Table 2: Average CompCost Per Connection

	-	± ± ± -	- - - -
CompCost	104.30	4.91√	3.59√
%rdc	na	95.23%	96.56%
	+	± ± ± ±	- - - +
CompCost	190.93	4.93√	4.85√
%rdc	na	97.42%	97.46%

√: significantly reduced

groups used pure knowledge engineering approaches. We can see from the figure that our detection model has the best overall performance, under the “acceptable” false alarm rate (under 0.02%). However, an overall detection rate of below 70% is hardly satisfactory in a mission critical environment.

### 4.3 Computational Cost Reduction

We compute both a single model and multiple models on the same DARPA dataset and compare their computational cost and accuracy. We measure the expected computational costs, denoted as *CompCost*, in our experiments. The expected computational cost over all occurrences of each connection class and the average computational cost per connection over the entire test set are defined as  $\frac{\sum_{c \in S_i} \text{CompCost}(c)}{|S_i|}$  and  $\frac{\sum_{c \in S} \text{CompCost}(c)}{|S|}$ , respectively, where  $S$  is the entire test set,  $i$  is a connection class, and  $S_i$  represents all occurrences of  $i$  in  $S$ . In all of our reported results, *CompCost*( $c$ ) is computed as the sum of the feature computation costs of all unique features used by all rules evaluated until a prediction is made for connection  $c$ .

#### 4.3.1 Results

In presenting our results, we use +, - and ± to represent +*freq*, -*freq* and *un-ordered* rulesets, respectively. A multiple model approach is denoted as a sequence of these symbols. For example, - - - indicates that all 4 rulesets are -*freq*.

Table 2 shows the average computational cost per connection for a single classifier approach  $R_4$  (- or +) and the respective multiple model approaches (± ± ± -, - - - - or ± ± ± ±, - - - +). The first row below each method is the average CompCost per connection and the second row is the re-

ROC's are not continuous. In fact, they should just be data points, one for each group. Lines are connected for display and comparison purposes.

Table 3: Precision/Recall for Each Connection Class

	CompCost		Accuracy	
	+	± ± ± ±	+	± ± ± ±
normal	190.99	4.18	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 0.99 & 0.99 \\ 0.99 & 0.99 \end{matrix}$
back	75	7	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
buffer_overflow	175	75	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
ftp_write	146	60.5	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 0.88 & 5 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 & \end{matrix}$
guess_passwd	191	37	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 0.91 & 0.91 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
imap	181	95.3	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 0.83 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
ipsweep	191	1	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 0.99 & 0.99 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
land	191	1	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
load_module	168.78	67	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 0.9 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
multihop	182.43	88.42	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 0.88 & 0.88 \end{matrix}$
neptune	191	1	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
nmap	191	1	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
perl	151	77	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
phf	191	1	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
pod	191	1	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 0.98 & 0.98 \end{matrix}$
portsweep	191	1	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 0.99 & 0.99 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
rootkit	155	54.2	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 0.6 \\ 0.77 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
satan	191	1	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 0.98 \\ 0.99 & 0.99 \end{matrix}$
smurf	191	1	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
spy	191	21.5	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
teardrop	191	1	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 1.0 & 1.0 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
warezclient	191	82.9	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 0.99 & 0.99 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$
warezmaster	191	87	$\begin{matrix} TP \\ p \end{matrix}$	$\begin{matrix} 0.6 & 0.6 \\ 1.0 & 1.0 \end{matrix}$

duction (%rdc) by the multiple model over the respective single model,  $\frac{\text{Single-Multiple}}{\text{Single}} \times 100\%$ . As clearly shown in the table, there is always a significant reduction by the multiple model approach. In all configurations, the reduction is more than 95%. An average CompCost of no greater than 5 means that in practice we can classify most connections by examining the first three packets of the connection at most 5 times. This significant reduction is due to the fact that  $R_1$ ,  $R_2$  and  $R_3$  are very accurate in filtering *normal* connections (including intrusions not worthy of response and re-labeled as *normal*), and a majority of connections in real network environments are *normal*. Our multiple model approach thus computes more costly features only when they

are needed. This is shown in the first two columns of Table 3, which lists the detailed average CompCost for each connection class for + and  $\pm \pm \pm$ .

Detailed precision and TP<sup>4</sup> rates of four sample models are shown in last two columns of Table 3 for different connection classes. The values for the single classifier and multiple classifier methods are very close to each other. This shows that the coverage of the multiple classifier method is similar to those of the corresponding single classifier method.

## 5 Discussion

We have presented how data mining approaches can be applied to system audit data to construct features and models for intrusion detection. The main benefit is that, instead of using the unreliable expert knowledge to manually construct detection models, we can semi-automatically compute (or mine), from a large amount of data, more accurate models. An official evaluation showed that our mined models performed very well when compared with purely knowledge-engineered models. Our experiments also showed that our multiple-model approach can be used to construct models with less computational cost while maintaining accuracy. We are developing a real-time system to verify that this approach can indeed reduce run-time detection delay.

There are limitations in our current approaches, which present research opportunities and challenges.

Our data mining approaches compute only the “frequent” patterns of connection records. Many intrusions, e.g., those that embed all activities within a single connection, do not have frequent patterns in connection data. Some of these intrusions have frequent patterns in packet data. However, there is no fixed format of packet data contents, and hence we cannot use our (attribute-based) data mining programs. *Free text mining* algorithms are needed for packet data. Still, some of these intrusions involve only a single event (e.g., one command), and hence leave no frequent patterns even in packet data. Thus, we need algorithms capable of mining *rare and unexpected* patterns for these intrusions.

We had hoped that the features we constructed would be general enough so that new variations of known intrusions can also be detected by our *misuse detection* models. The results from the 1998 DARPA evaluation showed that our models were able to de-

<sup>4</sup>Unlike precision, TP rate describes the fraction of occurrences of a connection class that were correctly labeled. Using the same notation as in the definition of precision,  $TP = \frac{|P \cap W|}{|W|}$ .

tect a large percentage of new PROBING and U2R attacks because these attacks have relatively limited variances. However, our models were not as effective for new DoS and R2L attacks because they exploit the weaknesses of a large number of different services (hence a wide variety of behavior) [11]. We need *anomaly detection* models to detect new attacks. Anomaly detection is much more challenging than misuse detection. *False alarm* may not be avoided because a new (or previously not observed) normal activity can trigger an alarm. In the real-world, the false alarm rate has to be extremely low (given the huge number of connections) for the system to be acceptable to human operators <sup>5</sup>.

There is an increasing trend of distributed and coordinated attacks. Merging audit data from different sites is not efficient, and may not be possible due to legal constraints. We need *correlation algorithms* capable of merging alarms (i.e., detection outcomes) from different sources.

## 6 Conclusion

Intrusion detection is a real-world application area critical to the well-being of our society. Based on the characteristics of system audit data, we developed specialized data mining algorithms to construct features and detection models. Our experiments showed that the mined models are accurate (compared with expert system) and efficient.

There are still many open problems. We as researchers must take up these opportunities and challenges, and make contributions to both data mining and intrusion detection.

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<sup>5</sup>A recent industry survey found that, on average, an operator spends one hour to investigate an alarm

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