

COMP435: *SECURITY CONCEPTS!*

Lecture 2: Intro to Threat Modeling

Please don't sit in the
back 4 rows 😊



THREATS, ATTACKS, AND COUNTERMEASURES



Threat



Vulnerability



Potential Harm:

- getting wet
- drowning



From last time: Some terminology

- Harm: a violation of a desired security policy
 - Ex: getting wet or drowning
- Vulnerability: a weakness that could be exploited to cause harm
 - Ex: a crack in the wall
- Threat: a set of circumstances that could cause harm
 - Ex: Water that might overflow or cause the wall to collapse



ATTACKS



Attack


- Definition: deliberate actions taken to exploit a vulnerability and cause harm
- E.g., a person waits until the house is empty and the door is left open, and then walks in.

Attack Terminology

- Attack
- Attack Surface
- Attack Vector
- Threat Agent
- Adversary
- Attacker

Attack Terminology


- *Attack*
- Attack Surface
- Attack Vector
- Threat Agent
- Adversary
- Attacker



Def: deliberate actions taken to exploit vulnerabilities and cause harm

Attack Terminology


- Attack
- ***Attack Surface***
- Attack Vector
- Threat Agent
- Adversary
- Attacker



Def: the reachable and exploitable vulnerabilities in a system

Attack Terminology


- Attack
- Attack Surface
- ***Attack Vector***
- Threat Agent
- Adversary
- Attacker



Def: specific sequence of steps by which attacks are carried out

Attack Terminology


- Attack
- Attack Surface
- Attack Vector
- *Threat Agent*
- *Adversary*
- Attacker



Def: source of the threat; entity that might attack

Attack Terminology

- Attack
- Attack Surface
- Attack Vector
- Threat Agent
- Adversary
- ***Attacker***



Def: an adversary who has
actually attacked

THE ADVERSARY & THE VICTIM



Adversaries

- Informs what types of attacks we need to consider

fame, money, malice,
revenge, information,
ideology

Motivation

physical attacks,
technological attacks,
process-related
attacks, manipulation
or coercion, cover-up

Methods

money, power,
influence, compute
power, distributed
compute power,
inside knowledge,
insider access and
capability, time,
expertise, tools

Resources

Adversaries

- Individuals
- Organized crime
- Politically motivated groups
- Industrial competitors
- State-funded agencies
- Terrorists



Human Impact

- emotional
- financial
- physical
- personal data
- relationships
- societal well-being



CONTROLS & COUNTERMEASURES



Controls & Countermeasures

- Prevention vs. Detection
- Pre- vs. Post- Deployment
- Technical vs. Procedural vs. Physical

HOW?: protocols, access control, monitoring, security evaluation, penetration testing, auditing, logging





Policy:

- only family members and their guests may enter
- only family members can take objects out of the house

Adversary:

- motivation: steal money
- resources: knowledge of family schedule
- first attack: walk in open door

Assumptions:

Countermeasures

1. locks on doors

2.

3.

4.

New Attacks

1. opening a window

2.

3.

4.

Security is Challenging

- The attacker has the advantage
- There is a trade-off between security and usability
- Getting the policy right is difficult



THREAT MODELING




Threat Model

- Def: identifies the threats, adversaries, and attack vectors of a system
- I.e., what it is that we need to defend against.


Threat Modeling



Trees



Diagrams



Lists

- Spoofing
- Tampering
- Repudiation
- Information disclosure
- Denial of service
- Escalation of privilege

STRIDE



ATTACK TREES





root node:
goal of attack





enter
house















leaf nodes













Worksheet Q2!



Will be detected?





Will be detected?





Will be detected?



Can be launched remotely?




Will be detected?



Can be launched remotely?


Case 1: AND nodes





* LABEL
PROPAGATES IF
BOTH NODES
LAUNCHABLE
REMOTELY*







Case 2: OR nodes


* LABEL
PROPAGATES IF
ANY NODE
LAUNCHABLE*






Worksheet Q3!







1. Expand window, tunnel, or wall by two levels
2. Add “2+ adversaries required” labels
3. Propagate the labels



Worksheet Q4!

Attack Trees



- Methodical
- Builds knowledge base
- Useful during design

Pros



- False sense of accuracy & security
- Never complete
- Time consuming

Cons