

\*\*COMP 790: OS Implementation

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## Windows object model

- Everything, including files, is represented as a generic OS object
- New object types can be created/extended with arbitrary methods beyond just open/read/write/etc.
- · Objects are organized into a tree-like hierarchy
- Try out Windows object explorer (winobj)
  - Sysinternals.net

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# Background (2)

- A big goal for Windows NT and 2000 was centralizing workstation administration at companies/etc.
  - Create a user account once, can log onto all systems
  - Vs. creating different accounts on 100s of systems
- Active Directory: a Domain server that stores user accounts for the domain
  - $-\mbox{ Log}$  on to a workstation using an AD account
  - Ex: CS\porter Domain CS, user id porter
  - Used by CS department today, centralizes user management

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#### **Active Directory**

- Centralized store of users, printers, workstations, etc.
- Each machine caches this info as needed
  - $\boldsymbol{-}$  Ex., once you log in, the machine caches your credentials

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### **Big Picture**

- OSes need a "language" to express what is allowed and what isn't
- · Access Control Lists are a common way to do this
- Structure: "Allowed | Denied: Subject Verb Object"

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## Unix permissions as ACLs

-rw-----@ 1 porter staff 151841 Nov 10 08:45 win2kacl.pdf

- Allowed | Denied: Subject Verb Object
- · Allowed: porter read win2kacl.pdf
- Allowed: porter write win2kacl.pdf
- · Denied: staff read win2kacl.pdf
- · Denied: other \* win2kacl.pdf

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## Fine-grained ACLs

- Why have subjects other than users/groups?
  - Not all of my programs are equally trusted
  - Web browser vs. tax returns
  - Want to run some applications in a restricted context
- · Still want a unified desktop and file system
  - Don't want to log out and log in for different applications
- Real goal: Associate a restricted context with a program

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## Why different verbs/objects

- · Aren't read, write, and execute good enough?
- · Example: Changing passwords
  - Yes, you read and write the password file
  - But not directly (since I shouldn't be able to change other passwords)
  - Really, the administrator gives a trusted utility/service permission to write entries
  - And gives you permission to call a specific service function (change password) with certain arguments (namely your own user id/pass)



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## Fine-grained access control lists

- Keep user accounts and associated permissions
  - But let users create restricted subsets of their permissions
- In addition to files, associate ACLs with any object
  - ACLs can be very long, with different rules for each user/context
- And not just RWX rules
  - But any object method can have different rules

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#### Big picture

- ACLs are written in terms of enterprise-wide principals
  - Users in AD
  - $\boldsymbol{-}$  Objects that may be system local or on a shared file system
  - Object types and verbs usually in AD as well
- ACLs are associated with a specific object, such as a file

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### Complete!

- Assertion: Any security policy you can imagine can be expressed using ACLs
  - Probably correct
- Challenges:
  - Correct enforcement of ACLs
  - Efficient enforcement of ACLs
  - Updating ACLs
  - Correctly writing the policies/ACLs in the first place

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#### Correct enforcement

- Strategy: All policies are evaluated by a single function
- Implement the evaluation function once
  - Audit, test, audit, test until you are sure it looks ok
- Keep the job tractable by restricting the input types
- All policies, verbs, etc. have to be expressed in a way that a single function can understand
  - Shifts some work to application developer



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#### Efficient enforcement

- Evaluating a single object's ACL is no big deal
- When context matters, the amount of work grows substantially
- Example: The Linux VFS checks permission starting at the current directory (or common parent), and traverses each file in the tree
  - Why?
  - To check the permissions that you should be allowed to find this file

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#### Efficiency

- In addition to the file system, other container objects create a hierarchy in Windows
- Trade-off: Either check permissions from top-down on the entire hierarchy, or propagate updates
  - Linux: top-down traversal
  - Alternative: chmod o-w /home/porter
    - Walk each file under /home/porter and also drop other's write permission

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
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#### Efficiency, cont

- AD decided the propagating updates was more efficient
- Intuition: Access checks are much more frequent than changes
  - Better to make the common case fast!

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# ls /home/porter

drwxr-xr--x porter porter 4096 porter

chmod o+r /home/porter/public

# chmod o-r porter

# ls /home/porter drwxr-x---x porter p

Recursively change all children to o-r.

But do you change public?

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# Issues with propagating

- Need to distinguish between explicit and inherited changes to the child's permissions when propagating
  - Ex 1: If I take away read permission to my home directory, distinguish those files with an explicit read permission from those just inheriting from the parent
  - Ex 2: If I want to prevent the administrator from reading a file, make sure the administrator can't countermand this by changing the ACL on /home

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# AD's propagation solution

- When an ACL is explicitly changed, mark it as such
  - Vs. inherited permissions
- · When propagating, delete and reapply inherited permissions
  - Leave explicit ACLs alone



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# Challenge: Policies to ACLs

- · Assertion: Translating policies to ACLs is hard
- Hard to:
  - Express some policies as ACLs
  - Write the precise ACL you want
  - Identify all objects that you want to restrict
- Much research around developing policy languages that better balance: human usability and implementation correctness
  - This system strongly favors implementation correctness

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# **Example Policy**

- "Don't let this file leave the computer"
- · Ideas?

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- Create a restricted process context that disables network access
- Only give read permission to this context
- But, what if this process writes the contents to a new file? Or over IPC to an unrestricted process?
  - Does the ACL propagate with all output?
  - If so, what if the program has a legitimate need to access other data?

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### Summary

- · Basic idea of ACL
- · How it is used in Windows/AD
  - How extended for fine granularity
- · Challenges with hierarchical enforcement, writing policies

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