

Transys: Leveraging Common Security Properties Across Hardware Designs

Rui Zhang, Cynthia Sturton (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, S&P'20)




THE UNIVERSITY
of NORTH CAROLINA
at CHAPEL HILL

Introduction

Security Validation

- Validating the security of hardware designs is important.
- Developing a comprehensive set of security properties is challenging.



Goal

Reduce the manual effort for developing security properties.

Contribution

- A systematic approach for security property translation.
- Transys: a tool to translate security properties across hardware designs.

Background


Hardware Security Properties

- Restricted Temporal Logic**
 - $G(A \rightarrow B)$, G means globally, may contain X (next) operator.
 - Example: AES round keys should be derived from the cipher key correctly.
 - $(state == 4) \rightarrow (next_key_reg[31:0] == next_key_reg[63:32] \oplus last_key_i[31:0])$
- Gate Level Information Flow Tracking**
 - Variables are tagged to track how information is allowed to flow.
 - Example: The key is safe to flow to the ciphertext.
 - set $key[0] := high$; assert $cipher[0] == high$

Transys Design

Overview

- Gist: do the translation in three phases.
- Inputs: RTL implementations and a set of security properties.
- Manual review is still required.



Variable Mapping

- Goal:** Find appropriate counterpart.
- Matching Windows**
 - Modules in HDL
- Extracting Features from AST, PDG**

Type	Feature
Statistical	Variable Type (Input, Output, Wire, Reg)
	No. of Blocking Assignments
	No. of Non-Blocking Assignments
	No. of Assignments
	No. of Branch Conditions
Semantic	Variable Names
	Dependence Graph Height
Structural	No. of Operators
	Centroid

Matching Variables

- $d_{stat}(p, q), d_{struct}(p, q) = \sqrt{(q_1 - p_1)^2 + \dots + (q_n - p_n)^2}$
- $d_{seman} = 1 - \frac{2 \times |pairs(s_1) \cap pairs(s_2)|}{|pairs(s_1)| + |pairs(s_2)|}$
- Distance between variables: $d(v_1, v_2) = \alpha d_{seman} + \beta d_{stat} + \gamma d_{struct}$
- We choose α to be the largest and β to be the smallest.

Structural Transformation

- Goal:** Adjust arithmetic expressions.
- Observation**
 - If in D1, the property variables are related to each other, in D2 the correlation among the variables are often explicitly stated in the code.
- Approach**
 - Pick two most high-confidence variables
 - Learn the arithmetic expression between the variables from PDG.
- Timing Issue**
 - For every nonblocking assignment, we add a X (next) to the property.

Constraint Refinement


- Goal:** Make the property P valid in Φ_D .
- $\Phi_D \wedge \neg P$ is UNSAT.
- Only consider Case 1 and 4.

No.	Orig.	New Format	Simplified
1	$A \rightarrow B$	$A \wedge C \rightarrow B$	$A \wedge C \rightarrow B$
2		$A \vee C \rightarrow B$	$(A \rightarrow B) \wedge (C \rightarrow B)$
3		$A \rightarrow B \wedge D$	$(A \rightarrow B) \wedge (D \rightarrow B)$
4		$A \rightarrow B \vee D$	$A \wedge \neg D \rightarrow B$

- Find a sequence of conjuncts such that $\Phi_D \wedge \neg P \wedge A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_n$ is UNSAT, but $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_n$ is SAT.

Approach

- Fact: $x \wedge \neg x$ is UNSAT.



- Timing Issue: Consider one time step at a time.

Evaluation


Experiment Setup

- We collect 27 security properties in temporal logic and 9 in information flow tracking.
- We evaluate Transys on 38 AES, 3 RSA, and 5 RISC processor designs.

Translation Results

Designs	Total Transl.	Total Succ.	Rate
AES	360	336	93%
AES w/ Trojans	400	400	100%
RSA	18	18	100%
CPU	46	39	85%
Total	824	793	96%

Semantic Equivalence



Performance

Designs	Average Transl. Time
AES	28.8s
RSA	0.46s
CPU	189s
Average	70s

Transl. Examples

Orig: $(state == 4) \rightarrow (next_key_reg[31:0] == next_key_reg[63:32] \oplus last_key_i[31:0])$

Pass	Translation Results
VM	$(key_exp.pstate==4) \rightarrow (key_exp.key_in[31:0] == key_exp.key_in[63:32] \oplus key_exp.key_in[31:0])$
ST	$(key_exp.pstate==4) \rightarrow (key_exp.wr_data == key_exp.key_in[255:192])$ $(key_exp.pstate==4) \rightarrow (key_exp.wr_data == key_exp.key_in[191:128])$
CR	$(key_exp.key_start == 1) \& (key_exp.round[1:0] == 2'b01) \rightarrow \#1 (key_exp.wr_data == prev(key_exp.key_in[255:192])) \mid (key_exp.wr3 == 0)$ $(key_exp.key_start == 0) \& (key_exp.key_start_L == 1) \& (key_exp.round[1:0] == 2'b01) \rightarrow \#1 (key_exp.wr_data == prev(key_exp.key_in[191:128])) \mid (key_exp.wr3 == 0)$